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Abstract—Economic and operational advantages have led the
supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) to incorporate
various untrusted entities. Any of the untrusted entities are ca-
pable of introducing malicious alterations to facilitate a functional
failure or leakage of secret information during field operation.
While researchers have been investigating the threat of malicious
modification within the scale of individual microelectronic com-
ponents, the possibility of a board-level malicious manipulation
has essentially been unexplored. In the absence of standard
benchmarking solutions, prospective countermeasures for PCB
trust assurance are likely to utilize homegrown representation of
the attacks that undermines their evaluation and does not provide
scope for comparison with other techniques. In this paper, we
have developed the first-ever benchmarking solution to facilitate
an unbiased and comparable evaluation of countermeasures
applicable to PCB trust assurance. Based on a taxonomy tailored
for PCB-level alterations, we have developed high-level Trojan
models. From these models, we have generated a custom pool of
board-level Trojan designs of varied complexity and functionality.
We have also developed a tool-flow for automatically inserting
these Trojans into various PCB designs and generate the Trojan
benchmarks (i.e., PCB designs with Trojan). The tool-based
Trojan insertion facilitate a comprehensive evaluation against
large number of diverse Trojan implementations and application
of data mining for trust verification. Finally, with experimental
measurements from a fabricated PCB, we analyze the stealthiness
of the Trojan designs.
Index Terms—Printed Circuit Board (PCB) , Trust Verification,
Hardware Trojan
I. INTRODUCTION
Printed circuit boards (PCBs) are the backbone of almost all
electronic systems. They contain a diverse set of microelec-
tronic components starting from simple passive devices like
diodes, transistors, resistors, capacitors to complex integrated
circuits (ICs) like microprocessors, field-programmable gate
arrays (FPGA), and memories. The design and fabrication
process of these PCBs involves several untrusted vendors
capable of introducing malicious change in the system to
facilitate a detrimental outcome in the field. Such inclusion of
PCB-level malicious circuits at foreign facilities has already
been reported with the affirmation from 17 anonymous private
and government agency sources [1]. According to the report,
computer server motherboards used in at least 30 US corporate
and government entities have been found compromised with
this supply chain attack. Even though many have questioned
the authenticity of this attack, the article, nevertheless, high-
lights board-level malicious inclusion as a serious threat to
the trustworthiness of modern electronic system. This threat
calls for effective countermeasures that can prevent, detect,
and tolerate such attacks. While a vast amount of research
has explored the various facets of malicious circuits inside
individual microelectronic components, a more complex attack
vector that introduces board-level malicious functionalities has
received little to no attention [2].
Modeling the attack vector is a critical step towards assuring
trust at the PCB-level. The construction and behavior of
malicious circuits can be completely different depending on
which entities in the PCB supply chain we assume to be
untrusted. In the absence of a comprehensive taxonomy of
PCB-level Trojans and associated benchmarks, research in the
domain of PCB trust can suffer from the following challenges:
• Researchers are likely to validate their countermeasures
using hand-crafted Trojan instances. Such home-grown
designs are not guaranteed to meet the design require-
ments that allow the Trojans to go undetected under
existing inspection and verification techniques.
• Validating the countermeasures using hand-crafted ma-
licious circuits that are publicly unavailable deters the
scope for comparing different solutions.
On the other hand, a suite of publicly available custom Tro-
jan benchmarks with few representative examples for different
classes of Trojans have the following deficiencies:
• Custom Trojan benchmarks only represents a small subset
of the possible design variations an attacker could ex-
plore. While certain countermeasures may work well for
those limited number of Trojans due to some inherent
bias in their designs, the solutions may still fail when
applied in the field.
• Application of supervised machine learning based so-
lutions in detecting Trojans require a large number
of examples to train from [3]. Training data obtained
from the limited examples available in a custom Trojan
benchmark suite may not be adequate for generating a
robust trained model capable of identifying the intended
malicious behaviour.
To eliminate the aforesaid challenges, we have developed a
detailed taxonomy of PCB-level malicious circuits with vari-
ous examples of custom Trojans in the form of schematic and
layout that are suitable for static analysis, dynamic analysis,
and fabrication. We also have developed the first-ever tool,
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to the best of our knowledge, to automatically create PCB
benchmarks by inserting these Trojans in various PCB designs.
The Trojan benchmark suite is built upon 10 open-source
baseline PCB designs of various complexities. Each of these
baseline designs are inserted with different types of Trojans
to generate around 150 infected PCB designs. The baseline
designs are of different complexities and sizes. To define the
Trojan models, we first develop a dedicated taxonomy of PCB-
level Trojans. The taxonomy classifies the design space of
board-level Trojans with respect to their phase of insertion
in the supply chain, abstraction level of the PCB, activation
mechanism, the impact of payload, location of insertion, and
physical characteristics. Compared to existing taxonomy of IC-
level Trojans [4], PCB-level Trojans differ in various aspects.
For instance, while the integration of Trojan after fabrication
is considered infeasible at the IC-level, it is a potential threat
for PCBs as new components can be soldered onto the board
even after fabrication.
Finally, to insert a large number of diverse Trojans in
different PCB designs, we have developed a Trojan insertion
tool. The tool takes the template of a Trojan model and a
sample PCB design in the form of a netlist. It also takes
some configuration information as inputs to define the number
of Trojans and type of Trojan and then inserts them into
the sample design. Overall, we make the following major
contributions:
• We rework the existing classification of malicious cir-
cuits to develop a taxonomy of hardware Trojan attacks
applicable to PCB.
• We develop several custom Trojan designs for PCB with
different trigger and payload mechanisms.
• We present a toolflow to automatically insert a large
number of Trojans in PCB designs. Such a tool is bene-
ficial for a comprehensive evaluation of trust verification
techniques and application of machine learning.
• We evaluate the Trojan designs using experimental results
obtained from a fabricated PCB containing several board-
level Trojans.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following: Section II
describes the necessary definitions and existing studies on Tro-
jan benchmarking. Section III presents the Trojan taxonomy
and the Trojan designs. Section IV elaborates the automatic
Trojan insertion process. Experimental results are presented in
Section V with conclusive remarks in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Definitions
1) PCB-level Trojan: PCBs consist of various microelec-
tronic components spread across multiple alternating layers
of conducting and insulating materials. Conductive planes
across different layers are connected through vias. A PCB-
level Trojan can be designed by introducing additional compo-
nents that do not contain any malicious sub-circuit internally.
For instance, to construct a PCB-level Trojan, an attacker
may introduce several additional NPN transistors that strictly
follow the behaviour of a generic NPN transistor but do
not have any relation in serving the intended functionality
of the PCB. Board-level Trojans could also be introduced
without integrating additional components by only altering
the structural and/or parametric behaviour of conducting (e.g.,
copper traces, vias, etc.) and insulating parts of the PCB layers.
More complex attack vectors utilizing both intra-board and
intra-component modification are possible as well. However,
in this paper, we assume that the individual microelectronic
components performs their designated functionality and there
is no malicious functionality hidden inside the components.
2) PCB Trojan Benchmarks: A PCB Trojan benchmark is a
PCB design with one or more PCB-level Trojan modifications.
The benchmark could be in the form of specification, netlist,
schematic, or layout.
B. Related Work
Existing work on PCB security primarily involves counter-
feit PCB detection [5], [6] and detection of PCB tampering
in the field [7]. The possibility of hardware Trojan attacks
in PCB was first discussed in [8] with a general models of
Trojans attacks applicable to PCB. They also demonstrate
two specific attack instances assuming different sets of supply
chain entities to be untrusted. However, it does not provide a
detailed taxonomy for PCB-level Trojans and does not present
any benchmark suite. Existing work on hardware Trojan tax-
onomoy and benchmarking covers malicious modification of
digital IC designs [4]. A benchmark suite containing 96 Trojan
inserted designs are available in the Trust-HUB website. These
designs are provided as register-transfer-level code, gate-level
netlist, and layout. The Trojans are inserted in various IP cores
such as AES, RS232, MP8051, etc. The suite contain few
representative Trojan benchmarks from various broad classes
of Trojans in the taxonomy.
To eliminate the limitations inherent to a static benchmark
suite, [9] proposed a tool-based Trojan insertion process to
generate a diverse possible implementation for each class of
Trojans. The tool takes a sample gate-level design of an IC and
some configuration parameters that define the functional and
structural behaviour of the Trojans to be inserted. The tool
identifies potential regions in the sample design for Trojan
insertion and integrates a gate-level Trojan circuit. It also
verifies if the Trojan can be activated under specific input
pattern to the design. Similar to Trust-HUB Trojans, the
current tool-based Trojan insertion methods do not serve the
benchmarking purpose for PCB-level Trojan attacks.
III. HARDWARE TROJAN ATTACK IN PCB
A. PCB Trojan Taxonomy
The only existing classification of PCB-level Trojans divides
the Trojan space into two broad categories [8]. In the first
category, the the design house is assumed to be trusted, and in
the second one, both design house and foundry are considered
to be untrusted. To precisely identify the coverage, strengths,
and weaknesses of various countermeasures, a taxonomy of
Trojans with fine-grained classification is required. Again,
Fig. 1. Taxonomy of PCB-level hardware Trojans. The dotted-box show the Trojan classes primarily applicable to PCBs.
Fig. 2. High-level illustration of the Addition Model. We present various
methods to construct hard-to-activate trigger circuits and payload circuits to
leak a victim signal or corrupt its functionality.
existing taxonomy for IC-level Trojans do not directly apply
to PCB as their design abstractions, flexibility for modifica-
tion, and post-fabrication physical access to the internals are
different [4]. Hence, based on the existing studies, we have
developed a fine-grained classification for PCB-level Trojans
as presented in Fig. 1. We can observe several categories of
Trojans that are only applicable for PCBs (marked with dotted
box). For instance, addition of new components or alteration of
traces after fabrication and assembly of the board is feasible in
PCB [7]. Such modifications are usually considered as invasive
physical attacks. The goal of PCB physical tampering is to
observe an immediate malicious outcome during the attack,
such as modchip attacks in gaming consoles [10]. However,
Trojan insertion, whether before or after fabrication, is likely
to occur with a goal to compromise the system in a later
stage of deployment. Most in-field invasive attacks on ICs
require significant resources for decapsulation, delayering, and
modification at the nano-scale level [11]. For PCBs, physical
alteration after fabrication is more feasible, which motivates us
to consider post-fabrication alteration in the taxonomy. Phys-
ical alteration could also be used as an activation mechanism
for certain Trojans. For instance, thinning of traces at the
surface layer is very feasible and can be used to trigger a
failure from heating generated during long hours of operation
Fig. 3. Three different implementation of 2 input NAND: (a) using resistor-
transistor logic, (b) diode-transistor logic, and (c) transistor-transistor logic.
[8]. The location of Trojan insertion in a PCB can be classified
with respect to the target layer of alteration. For instance,
PCB designs developed by third-parties may have malicious
circuitry at the surface level of the PCB, as the consumers do
not have a reference design. However, in the presence of a
reference or “golden” design, the attacker is likely to target
alterations within the internal layers to remain stealthy.
B. Trojan Models and Designs
We use two high-level Trojan models to generate several
Trojan designs. These designs represent various Trojan classes
within the taxonomy. The first model requires the addition
of new components, thus named Addition Model. The second
model is called Alteration Model that alters the existing PCB
layout without adding new components.
1) Addition Model: Fig. 2 shows the generic structure of
this model that contains a trigger and a payload. The trigger
takes one or more inputs from the existing traces of the
board to construct a hard-to-activate trigger condition. Rare
activation is needed to minimize the probability that the Trojan
gets accidentally triggered during functional testing of the
board. Difficult activation can be ensured by integrating large
number of traces that rarely reach to a specific activation
condition, or by constructing a trigger circuit that requires mul-
tiple excitations of a condition. The payload can be designed
Fig. 4. A Trojan implanted with RTL logic: (a) a signal from from MCU 1 to MCU 2 (in green) is routed through a Trojan payload circuit (in red); (b) a
trigger circuit (4-input AND function) activates the payload when input from MCU 3 is 4b1111; (c) upon activation, the XOR payload inverts the victim.
Fig. 5. (a) Trigger circuit similar to A2 Trojan [13] where capacitor and op-
amps are used to design activation mechanism that requires the rare condition
to occur multiple times. Payload with single transistor: (b) impacts the victim
when the transistor is off, (c) impacts the victim when the transistor is on.
to achieve a number of malicious outcomes as described in
the taxonomy. Certain implementations may only contain a
payload (i.e., always-on Trojan [12]). However, such Trojans
must not cause any observable impact on the functionality of
the board as they are trivial to detect.
For the addition model, we assume that the PCB design
is untrusted. Hence, the consumer has no reference to iden-
tify components that are included for malicious purposes.
However, when selecting components for constructing the
Trojan, we try to utilize components that are very common
in a PCB design. For instance, diode, NPN/PNP transistors,
resistor, capacitors, op-amps are commonly found in a PCB
designs. Therefore, their presence in a third-party PCB design
is unlikely to raise question, specially if the board originally
contained them to provide the normal functionality. Including
a standalone microprocessor solely to perform a malicious
operation may allow easier identification through disassembly
and analysis of the program being executed on it. Below we
discuss various trigger and payload designs in this model.
Example Trigger Designs: To construct hard-to-activate
trigger circuits using diode, NPN/PNP transistors, resistor,
capacitors, and op-amps, we look at various logic families
including Resistor-Transistor Logic (RTL), Diode-Transistor
Logic (DTL), and TransistorTransistor Logic (TTL) [14].
These logic technologies can be used to implement any type
of Boolean function. As shown in Fig. 3, a 2-input NAND
function can be constructed differently using RTL, DTL, and
TTL design methods. This also provides a way to generate
a structural variant of a given trigger functionality. Fig. 4 (a)
shows one example of a Trojan that could be integrated by an
untrusted design house to alter the state of a critical signal sent
from MCU 1 to MCU 2. Fig. 4 (b) shows the corresponding
trigger logic implementing a 4-input AND function in RTL
method. When the four inputs of the trigger circuit (i.e.,
TRIG1 to TRIG4) become logic high simultaneously, the
output of the trigger logic (TRIG_EN) becomes logic high.
We can construct a trigger logic cone of any number of
inputs using this method. To incorporate a counter-based
trigger condition, we take inspiration from the Trojan design
methods presented in A2 [13]. As shown in Fig. 5, using a
capacitor, diode, and Op-Amp, it is possible to construct a
trigger circuit that only activates when the capacitor is charged
to reach a reference voltage defined by the two feedback
resistors connected to the Op-Amp. Each time TRIG stays
high, the capacitor starts charging and the charge stays in the
capacitor even if TRIG goes low. Hence, if we remove the
diode, the trigger condition becomes even harder to achieve
due to the discharge path for the capacitor. In that case, to
make TRIG_EN high TRIG must maintain high for a specific
amount of time until the capacitor gets charged completely.
Example Payload Designs: Using the similar concept of
generating Boolean logic using RTL, DTL, and TTL technol-
ogy, we have designed several payload designs. For instance,
XOR logic is often used as a payload for inverting a victim
signal once a trigger condition is observed. A 2:1 MUX logic
is used for functional leakage. Fig. 4 (c) shows a payload
implementation using XOR logic in RTL technology. We also
show the use of a single transistor to construct a payload
that causes a critical signal to stuck at logic high or low.
For example the two payloads in Fig. 5 (b) and (c) can be
connected to a trigger to cause such conditional fault. The
payload in (b) causes the Victim_Mod to become low when
TRIG_EN becomes low and keeps the transistor off. The
payload in (c) causes the Victim_Mod to become low when
TRIG_EN becomes high and keeps the transistor on.
If a design house is the victim and a foundry is the attacker,
introducing such a Trojan is difficult due to the availability of a
TABLE I
SAMPLE PCB DESIGNS FOR INSERTING TROJANS
# Name of the board Dimension No. of Components No. of Layers Example Components
1 CIAA-ACC 95.25mm*91.44mm 569 12 R, C, D, Sw, µC, FPGA, DRAM, Transistor, Ethernet, JTAG
2 EDU CIAA K60 76.4mm*137mm 187 2 R, C, D, Sw, µC, EEPROM, Transreceiver, Transistor
3 EDU CIAA Intel 90.17mm*80.01mm 87 2 R, C, D, Sw, µC, Transistor
4 EDU CIAA NXP 76.4mm*137mm 196 2 R, C, D, Sw, µC, EEPROM, Transreceiver
5 CIAA K60 137.008mm*86.03mm 467 4 R, C, D, Sw, µC, Transistor, OpAmp, Transreceiver, JTAG, SPI
6 CIAA FSL Mini 71.12mm*99.695mm 142 4 R, C, D, Sw, µC, Transreceiver, Transistor
7 CIAA NXP 138.43mm*86.36mm 443 4 R, C, D, Sw, µC, Ethernet, SPI, Transreceiver, OpAmp, BJT
8 CIAA PIC 138.725mm*86.175mm 435 4 R, C, D, Sw, µC, SPI, Oscillator, Transistors, SRAM, OpAmp
9 CIAA PICO 50.80mm*30.48mm 67 2 R, C, LED, D, µC, Transistor
10 CIAA RX 135.896mm*83.948mm 450 4 R, C, D, Sw, µC, SPI, Transreceiver, DRAM, Transistor, OpAmp
11 CIAA SAFETY VTI 95.890mm*90.170 283 2 R, C, D, Sw, µC, JTAG, Transreceiver, Flash memory, Transistor
12 CIAA Z3R0 18.8mm*51.81mm 34 2 R, C, LED, D, µC
*R: Resistor, C: Capacitor, D: Diode, Sw: Switch, µC: microcontroller
reference design to the design house for verification. However,
inclusion of new components is still possible in a situation
where the design house does not have the ability to observe
the internal layers of the fabricated PCB through reverse
engineering. Hence, the foundry could attempt to embed the
additional components to the internal layers of the PCB [8].
2) Alteration Model: For the alteration model, we explore
the various trace modification techniques presented in [8] and
[15]. Signal state hijacking techniques have been discussed
in [15] through the alteration of drive strengths of different
signal connecting together. Such connections are common in
JTAG or other debug infrastructures where the debug pins are
connected to other pins of different board components. As
shown in Fig. 6, a trace from component 1 is designed to
drive component 3 and component 2. However, by configuring
the pin of component 3 as an output with a higher drive
strength than the output of component 1, the signal going to
the component 2 can be controlled via component 3. Drive
strength of a trace can be altered by modifying the trace
impedance, length, thickness, or by integrating buffers [15].
C. Sample PCB Designs for Trojan Insertion
To generate the Trojan benchmarks, we take several sample,
open-source PCB designs. More information about these sam-
ple designs can be found in [16]. As shown in Table I, these
designs contain diverse components including microcontroller,
FPGA, JTAG, transistors, resistor, capacitor, diode, etc. We
used different trigger and payload structure combinations
described in the addition model to create the Trojans and insert
them in these sample PCB designs. To automate the insertion
Fig. 6. Example of Alteration Model: signal from component 3 with higher
drive strength can overdrive the signal going from component 1 to component
2. Drive strength can be increased through the alteration of trace impedance
or structure.
process, we used a Trojan insertion tool that will be described
in the following section.
IV. AUTOMATIC TOOL-BASED TROJAN INSERTION
Our goal is to automatically generate a large number of Tro-
jans with diverse structures that are hard to trigger. We utilize
the existing trigger and payload designs in the addition model
to generate different Trojans. The high-level methodology to
automatically insert these Trojans is illustrated in Fig. 7. The
tool first takes user-provided configuration parameters which
provide the option to select a desired trigger and payload
circuit and the number of Trojans to be inserted. Based on
this information, the tool selects the appropriate trigger and
payload templates that are available in the form of a netlist.
If the trigger and payload information is not specified by
the user, the tool selects a random combination from default
settings. The tool can also vary the value and arrangement of
passive components (resistors, capacitors, inductors) of a given
template to create structurally diverse, functionally equivalent
templates. The passive component values and types are chosen
based on the host PCB so as to not select a value vastly
different than existing numbers.
Fig. 7. Toolflow of the Trojan insertion tool.
TABLE II
TRIGGERS AND PAYLOADS OF THE FABRICATED TROJANS
Trojan Trigger Payload
Trojan1 4 input AND XOR
Trojan2 4 input NOR XOR
Trojan3 8 input Mixed (AND + NOR) XOR
Trojan4 8 input Mixed with Capacitor and diode MUX
Trojan5 8 input Mixed with Capacitor MUX
The tool takes the netlist representation of a sample PCB
design as an input. To generate the netlist, we use KiCAD PCB
design software [17]. Since we are looking to insert hard-to-
activate Trojans, the original PCB design can be simulated
to find rarely switching traces. The appropriate traces that
can be used as the input of a trigger must rarely reach the
activation value of that trigger circuit. Otherwise, the activation
condition may appear easily during functional verification by
the consumer and the Trojan will get triggered. For simulation
purposes we use external tools for spice simulation. If a CAD
tool can store the simulation results of different traces in a
file, our tool can utilize that. Proteus software can perform
such board-level simulation [18]. Our tool can analyze the
simulation results to automatically find the appropriate input
traces for connecting the trigger templates. It can also select
from user-provided traces. Similarly, the victim signal to
be leaked or corrupted can be specified by the user in the
configuration file, or can be selected randomly by the tool.
Next, the tool converts the sample PCB design to a graph
structure, (GPCB), to facilitate modification of the design.
Graph representation of the trigger and payload template is
augmented to the selected locations in GPCB . The modified
graph is then converted back to a PCB netlist containing the
Trojan using the tool. The netlist can be read using KiCAD.
The same process is repeated for generating the required
number of Trojans specified by the user. KiCAD provides the
ability to automatically generate the layout.
Benchmark Generation and Verification: To test the
toolflow, we provided the tool with the netlist of 5 different
triggers and 3 different payloads. The tool inserted all possible
combinations (15 total) of trigger and payload to each of the
sample PCB designs and generated a total of 150 PCB Trojan
benchmarks. To verify if these Trojans are inserted correctly,
we performed two forms of verification: connectivity check
and design rule violation check. For connectivity check, the
tool reads back the Trojan inserted netlist and checks if there is
a path between the location of Trojan insertion and the Trigger
nets. For design rule violation check, the netlist files are read
back with the KiCAD tool and automatically converted to
layout. The KiCAD tool can identify possible design rule
violations in the Trojan inserted design during this process.
These PCB Trojan benchmarks will be made available to the
public via [19]. The database may contain more Trojans as we
improve the capabilities of the tool.
Fig. 8. Increase in current consumption due to Trojan activation (obtained
from fabricated PCB).
Fig. 9. Fabricated PCB Trojan platform with five Trojans.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS FROM FABRICATED PCB
We designed a PCB Trojan platform by integrating five
Trojans with different trigger and payload combinations as
listed in Table IV. We used two 8-bit AVR microcontrollers
to drive all Trojan trigger inputs. The XOR payloads were
connected such that they corrupt various victim signals going
to seven segment displays. The MUX payloads were connected
to leak victim signals via highly probable or observable points
in the PCB, such as IOBs or LEDs. The fabricated PCB Trojan
platform is shown in Fig. 9.
To analyze the side-channel footprint of each Trojan, we
measured the board-level current while keeping the Trojan in
two states: inactive and active. In inactive mode, the input
to the Trojan under consideration was kept fixed at a value
that does not trigger the Trojan. Random vectors generated
from the two microcontrollers were applied to the rest of the
design that includes the other four Trojans. In active mode, we
caused switching activity in the Trojan under consideration by
applying vectors that alternatively activated and deactivated
the Trojan in quick intervals. The activity of the rest of the
PCB was kept the same as in the inactive mode. The current
consumption of the five Trojans in active and inactive states
is presented in Fig. 8. We can observe a maximum of 3.5%
increase in current consumption (for Trojan5). Without any
reference current signature to compare, such minor increase
in current consumption is unlikely to raise any suspicion.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a taxonomy for board-level malicious
circuits with associated designs of Trojans, specially for
scenarios where the PCB design is untrusted. We also have
presented a toolflow for generating large number of Trojan
inserted PCB designs automatically. We analyzed the feasi-
bility of the Trojan designs by fabricating a set of repre-
sentative Trojans in a PCB and observing their side-channel
footprint. Future work will include the development of always-
on Trojans for PCBs with low area footprint and experimental
evaluation of a number of Trojans from alteration model that
does not require any incorporation of new components.
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